It is widely documented that currency substitution (using foreign money in transactions) increases in periods of high inflation but does not decline once inflation is reduced. The paper uses survey data from Bulgaria, which experienced this phenomenon, to investigate the origins of this ratchet effect. We find that expected devaluation of the domestic currency, while relatively high, does not play a major role in sustaining the dollarization of transactions. Conversely, preferences for the use of foreign money are strongly influenced by people's perception that foreign money is already widely used in the economy.
Introduction
It is well established that dollarization 1 increases in times of high inflation as foreign currencies, usually the dollar, substitute for the domestic currency first as a store of value and then, if inflation reaches very high levels, also as medium of exchange. It is also well established, however, that de-dollarization does not occur, at least not fully, when disinflation is achieved. Instead economic agents continue to use foreign money in the financial system and in transactions. This ratchet effect is one of the stylized facts of dollarization (Calvo and Vegh, 1992) and has attracted considerable attention in the literature.
The explanations for the ratchet effect can be grouped into two main categories:
1) Network externalities: if economic agents can choose among several currencies for transactions they will prefer the currency that is already widely used in the economy; therefore, if dollarization reaches sufficiently high levels during a period of high inflation it will persist after inflation has declined because the dollar is already entrenched as a means of payment; and 2) Expected depreciation of the domestic currency: the less risky currency -the dollar, will be preferred because it preserves value better. In this framework, dollarization persists because of persistent doubts in the future stability of the local currency even if the current exchange rate is stable. The next section elaborates on these arguments.
Although there is substantial academic and policy interest in the hysteresis of currency substitution, the theories outlined above are difficult to validate empirically for lack of data on the use of multiple currencies in transactions. Similarly, Feige et al. (2002) , Feige et al (2003) , and Feige and Dean (2004) use these and additional sources (including survey data, a denomination displacement method, and a money demand method) to generate estimates of dollarization for Latin American and transition economies. These studies provide evidence for hysteresis by showing that a period of financial instability raises the level of dollarization for a long time after the episode of instability has ended. Furthermore, they argue that the network externality effect is the dominant factor explaining the persistence of dollarization.
This paper provides further evidence on the expected depreciation and the network externality hypotheses using survey data from Bulgaria. The survey includes questions designed specifically to investigate these effects on the micro level. Bulgaria is a typical case of the ratchet effect of high inflation on dollarization. It experienced hyperinflation in 1997, which led to the widespread dollarization of financial assets and transactions. It disinflated successfully by implementing a fixed exchange rate regime 2 In contrast, financial data from the banking system have been utilized in a number of papers to investigate the use of foreign currencies in the financial system (asset substitution). See Kamin and Ericsson (2003) , Ize and Levi-Yeyati (2003) , Martinez and Werner (2002) , Gruben and Welch (1996), Melvin (1988) , and Aghenor and Khan (1996) .
along with a currency board and has had single digit inflation for almost 10 years. Yet the euro and the dollar are still widely used for transactions and in the financial system.
The national survey in 2003 studied here helps explain this phenomenon. We find that expected devaluation of the domestic currency contributes to the hysterisis of dollarization but only for residents of small towns and villages. Conversely, preferences for the use of foreign money are strongly influenced by people's perception that foreign money is already widely used in the economy.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the theories of dollarization hysteresis in more detail. Section 3 describes the process of dollarization in Bulgaria. Sections 4 and 5 present the survey data and the empirical estimations, and Section 6 concludes.
Theories of dollarization hysteresis

Purchasing power risk
In Tandon and Wang (2003) , Craig and Waller (2004) , Camera et al. (2004), and Engineer (2000) transactions between economic agents can be carried out using more than one currency. The models usually have two currencies: the "dollar" which is a stable currency with a low risk of losing purchasing power and the local currency, the "peso,"
that has a positive probability of losing purchasing power. For example, Craig and Waller (2004) and Camera et al. (2004) model the purchasing power risk as a random government tax on domestic money holdings.
In that set-up, accepting the local currency in transactions is risky because the local currency might lose value before it is exchanged for goods. Therefore, persistent expectations of currency depreciation lead to persistent dollarization of transactions.
However, the models generate equilibria where the local currency is not fully displaced by the dollar despite the persistent doubts in its stability. Instead, the two currencies coexist, which matches closely what is observed in developing countries where the local currency and a foreign currency circulate simultaneously.
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In the models, the local currency remains a viable medium of exchange because the use of dollars entails a transaction cost. For example, in Engineer (2000) the cost of using dollars is assumed to be proportional to the size of the transaction. There are two main factors explaining the extent of dollarization in these models:
the purchasing power risk associated with using the local currency and the transactions 3 Multiple equilibria are possible if beliefs about the value of a currency as store of value and medium of exchange affect its actual use. In Tandon and Wang (2003) , a drop in confidence in the local currency lowers money demand. This decreases the inflation tax base and heightens the likelihood of seignorageinduced inflation. In Camera et.al. (2004) , an exogenous increase in the perceived value of a currency as medium of exchange raises its actual use as medium of exchange. Tandon and Wang underscore the "importance of institutional innovations (such as currency boards that issue credibly "backed" money) that could result in expectations of greater demand for domestic money by augmenting the confidence in domestic money." 4 The two currencies can coexist even in the absence of explicit transaction costs. In Craig and Waller (2004) and Camera et al. (2004) the degree of dollarization is a function of the riskiness of the local currency, the stock of money supplies, and the severity of trade frictions.
cost associated with using dollars. An increase in risk leads to greater dollarization. For a given level of risk, an increase in the transaction cost lowers the level of dollarization.
The relationship between incomplete confidence in the local currency and dollarization is explored by Melvin and Fenske (1992) and Clemens and Schwartz (1993) in the context of Bolivia. In a country with a history of exchange rate instability like Bolivia, dedollarization might not occur because the history of past instability feeds into expectations of future instability.
Despite the intuitive appeal of the hypothesis that the "good" money will drive out the "bad" (risky) money, this might not necessarily be the case. In Tandon and Wang (2003), Craig and Waller (2004) , and Engineer (2000) the riskier currency is used less in transactions. However, Camera et al. (2004) show that the opposite is also possible: the "bad" money can drive out the "good" money (as in Gresham's Law). In their model, while the buyers of goods prefer to dispose of the risky currency, the sellers of goods are reluctant to sell goods in exchange for the risky currency. The prices of goods denominated in the local currency will be higher reflecting the risk assumed by sellers. If the domestic currency prices are high, buyers might prefer to use the "good" currency in transactions and to hold on to the "bad" currency despite the risk of losing purchasing power. According to that view, expected depreciation might decrease rather than increase the use of dollars in transactions. the dollar will be preferred in transactions if it is already widely used.
An increase in exchange rate risk leads to an increase in the use of dollars as medium of exchange. In Uribe's model, if the use of dollar becomes widespread, dedollarization would not occur automatically after pegging the exchange rate, even if the peg is fully credible, because the transaction cost of using dollars has declined as a result of the increase in dollarization. To compare this to the papers discussed previously, a period of rapid exchange rate depreciation leads to persistent dollarization not because it fuels expectations of future exchange rate depreciation but because it lowers the cost of using foreign money. Of course, these are not competing hypotheses as the two effects can contribute to dollarization hysteresis independently.
The network externality outcome also obtains from first principles in the search theoretical models of money. In Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) , an object that has no intrinsic value can emerge as medium of exchange if people expect it to be accepted as a means of payments. The use of the object as medium of exchange essentially becomes a norm, a social convention. Therefore, if the dollar becomes widely used as a result of a period of financial instability, it will continue to be used after disinflation. Also, the dollar can become widely used simply because economic agents believe that it is useful as medium of exchange. Similarly, multiple equilibria are possible in Craig and Waller (2004) where the increased use of a currency (the "economy's accumulated experience" with using dollars in Uribe's model) increases the likelihood that it will be accepted in transactions thereby increasing its appeal as medium of exchange.
The role of network externalities has been supported by experimental studies, e.g., Duffy and Ochs (2002) and . For example, Camera et al. construct three experiments where money and an alternative asset with a positive return (consol)
can be used in transactions. In the first experiment where money and the consol are introduced simultaneously, the consol displaced money as medium of exchange as can be expected. In the second experiment money is introduced for several rounds of the game before introducing the consol. The experiment shows that money continues to be used as medium of exchange even after the consol is introduced. Furthermore, Camera et al. find that the habit of using money becomes entrenched even after only a few rounds of the game.
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5 As in the second experiment, in the third experiment the consol is introduced in later rounds. However, the dividend of the consol is now paid before trade occurs instead of after the trades. The altering of the timing of trade and the dividend payouts between experiments shows that the dividend-paying asset will be hoarded leading to shocks to its supply and to erratic price movements. In this environment money is the preferred medium of exchange.
Empirical hypotheses
Drawing on the literature, we can formulate the following empirical hypotheses regarding economic agents' preferences over the use of various currencies in transactions:
Hypothesis 1: The dollar will be preferred by economic agents who believe that dollars are already widely used in the economy.
Hypothesis 2: The dollar will be preferred by economic agents who expect the local currency to depreciate.
We need to make an important qualification to Hypothesis 2. As pointed out earlier, Camera et. al. (2004) explain that while buyers of goods are eager to get rid of the risky currency, sellers of goods are reluctant to accept it as they would assume the currency risk. The survey investigated in this paper asks respondents about their currency preferences from the perspective of sellers. In Camera et. al. (2004) 
Survey data
The survey used in this paper was conducted in August 2003 by a national polling agency using certified professionals. 8 The sample size of about 1000 respondents is representative of the population and is the standard size of national surveys in this country of 8 million citizens. To study preferences over various currencies in transactions, the survey asked respondents in what currency they would prefer to receive payments from a real estate sale, from a vehicle sale, from a real estate rental agreement, and for salaries. Table 1 shows that about 64 percent of respondents prefer the local currency for real estate sales, 26 percent prefer the euro and 10 percent prefer the dollar.
Less than one percent of the respondents prefer currencies other than these three.
Preferences for the local currency are stronger for wages, rents and vehicle sales compared to real estate sales. For example, 77 percent of the respondents prefer wages in the local currency. The next section explores the determinants of these preferences. respondents, and less educated respondents were on balance less happy about the idea of adopting the euro. These attitudes could be related to the degree of information about the euro as well as people's personal experiences using the euro in domestic transactions and while traveling. Our estimations investigate whether these factors work in the same direction when respondents are given the choice of multiple currencies for domestic transactions instead of being asked about the official adoption of the euro.
Explaining multiple currency preferences
To begin the analysis, Table 4 Table 5 reports marginal effects, which can be interpreted as the direct influence on the probability of stating a preference for the lev at the mean of an independent variable. In the case of dummy variables used as independent variables, the reported coefficient estimate equals the probability of preferring the lev if that dummy variable is one minus the probability of preferring the lev if it is zero.
In line with the evidence from Table 4 , Table 5 shows that Network Externalities are a strong influence on currency preferences. In terms of size, the coefficient 0.210 on Network Externality in the first column of results means that the probability of preferring the lev in real estate transactions is 21 percentage points higher for a respondent who believes that foreign currencies are widely used in the economy compared to the remaining respondents. The size of the coefficient on Network Externality is strongest for real estate transactions, then vehicle sales, then rental agreements, and finally salaries.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that this matches the ranking of these payments in terms of the actual use of foreign currencies in the economy.
Next, the results show that Expected Devaluation affects currency preferences but only if respondents reside in small towns and villages. The effect is statistically significant (at lower significance levels compared to Network Externality) for all transactions except salaries. In terms of size, the likelihood that a respondent in a small town or a village prefers the domestic currency declines by about 13 percentage points (0.026 -0.158 = -0.132) if the respondent expects devaluation of the lev.
Looking at the demographic characteristics, age is positive and statistically significant in all estimations and the size of the effect is similar across the estimations.
Each 10 additional years increase the likelihood of preferring the lev by about 7 percentage points. Similarly, female respondents, less educated respondents, respondents with lower income and those who reside in smaller towns and village also generally prefer the lev. These groups of respondents probably have less direct experience using foreign currencies, which are typically used in large transactions, and therefore are less willing to accept currencies other than the local money. For the same reason, fewer respondents in those groups would need foreign currencies to make future transactions as the lev is used in most day-to-day transactions.
Robustness checks
We obtain similar results using other definitions of Network Externality and Expected Devaluation such as several dummies for a very frequent use, frequent use, etc.
of foreign currencies and, similarly, for a very big, big, small, etc. likelihood of devaluation. 10 We also estimated the models with expected devaluation over the next six months or five years with similar results. Qualitatively similar results were also obtained with alternative education variables such as distinguishing between primary, high school, and higher education. Estimating the equations with age squared reveals some nonlinearity in the age effect. The positive effect of age on the preferences for the local currency increase substantially when respondents reach about 60 years of age.
Various specifications of the models were also estimated starting with a parsimonious specification including only Network Externality, Expected Devaluation, the interaction of Expected Devaluation with the dummy variable for small towns and villages, and the dummy variable for small towns and villages. Then we added the remaining explanatory variables one at a time. The estimated effects are similar to those reported in Table 5 . For example, the coefficient estimate on Network Externality is -0.224 in the parsimonious model explaining currency preferences in real estate transactions. This is very close to the coefficient estimate of -0.211 from the full model reported in table 5. Similarly, the coefficient estimate on the interaction variable of Expected Devaluation with small towns and villages is -0.134 in the parsimonious model and -0.158 in Table 5 .
The remaining explanatory variables also have similar effects to those reported in Table 5 . Although the correlation coefficients of many of the control variables are statistically significant, the sizes of the correlation coefficients are relatively small. For example, according to Appendix A, income and education are positively correlated but the correlation coefficient is only 0.22. Also, age and residence in small towns and villages are positively correlated but the correlation coefficient is only 0.07. Therefore, the estimated effects do not change substantially depending on the empirical specification.
Conclusion
The empirical results presented in this paper show that foreign currencies are preferred in transactions if they are already used widely in the economy and, for residents of small towns and villages, if the domestic currency is expected to depreciate. These 
Appendix B. The euro versus the dollar
We also estimated a multinomial logit model where the same independent variables used in the main text explain the choice between the lev, the euro, and the dollar. The advantage of this estimation is that we can determine whether certain factors influence not only the preferences for the domestic currency versus foreign currencies but also whether they determine the preferences among the foreign currencies. These results are reported in Table B1 . The analysis includes only the euro, the dollar and the lev since very few respondents preferred currencies other than these three. Furthermore, the table reports results only for real estate transactions as the results for salaries, vehicle sales and rents were similar.
The base outcome used in the estimations is preferences for the euro. Therefore the second column of coefficients resembles the results of Table 5 a Survey respondents who answered "very frequent" or "frequent" to the following question: Based on your observations, how frequent are transactions in Bulgaria in which foreign currencies are used instead of the lev? b Survey respondents who responded "very big" or "big" to the question: In your opinion, what is the likelihood that the currency board would collapse with large devaluation in the next 1 year. *** (**,*) indicate statistical significance from t-tests at the 1(5, 10) percent level. Table 5 The demand for local currency: Probit analysis 
